Choice of flexible production technologies under strategic delegation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic choice of flexible manufacturing technologies
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Japan and the World Economy
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0922-1425
DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2007.02.001