Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks
In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks arising from this capability. Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1571-0661
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2007.12.015