CLAWBACK PROVISIONS IN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Research

سال: 2016

ISSN: 0270-2592

DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12090