Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Supplement to “ Clearinghouses for two - sided matching : An experimental study
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences w1 : [f1] f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f1 : [w1] w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w2 : f1 [f2] f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f2 : w1 [w2] w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w3 : f1 f2 [f3] f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f3 : w1 w2 [w3] w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w4 : f1 f2 f3 [f4] f5 f6 f7 f8 f4 : w1 w2 w3 [w4] w5 w6 w7 w8 w5 : f1 f2 f3 f4 [f5] f6 f7 f8 f5 : w1 w2 w3 w4 [w5] w6 w7 w8 w6 : f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 [f6] f7 f8 f6 : w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quantitative Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1759-7323
DOI: 10.3982/qe496