Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Thum Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economica
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0013-0427
DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12065