Coalition formation problems with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study coalition formation problems with externalities. prove that, if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure may fail to exist. Under and efficient exists the set of admissible is single-lapping. However, under this assumption singleton, no strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from case without Finally, correspondence Nash implementable.
منابع مشابه
Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities
This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions pro...t from merging. Even under this strong condition, the formation of the grand coalition is not guaranteed. Therefore, the resulting coalit...
متن کاملBidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities
We study a coalition formation game with externalities where each agent’s payoff depends on the entire partition (see, e.g., Bloch (1996)). As in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), we assume that coalitions form sequentially and once a coalition forms, it cannot dissolve nor can its members forge new coalitions with the rest of the agents. However, instead of an exogenously given protocol, ...
متن کاملA coalition formation value for games with externalities
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, ta...
متن کاملEfficiency in coalition games with externalities
A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient pa...
متن کاملOn agent types in coalition formation problems
Coalitions and cooperation are key topics in multi–agent systems (mas). They enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve independently. A range of previous studies have found that many problems in coalitional games tend to be computationally intractable that is, the computational complexity grows rapidly as a function of the number of participating agents. However...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1873-7374', '0165-1765']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111112