Cognitive load and strategic sophistication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication
In three experiments we examine the extent to which strategic sophistication (i.e., inductive reasoning, iterative dominance and level-k thinking) is determined by broader cognitive skills. In the first experiment we replicate previous results showing strong associations between cognitive ability and sophistication in a game of iterative dominance. We then extend the results to a game requiring...
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Cognitive capacities differ among individuals. Experimentally observed behavior often shows significant inter-individual differences in decision making, and this observation has given rise to a rich literature developing theories endowing individuals with different levels of strategic sophistication or reasoning capability. Such models of iterative thinking (Stahl 1993; Stahl and Wilson 1995; H...
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We examine whether the ‘Level-k’ model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game testable predictions at the level of the individual player. Subjects’ observed levels are fairly consistent within one family of similar games, but within another family of games there is virtually no cross-game correlation. Moreover, the relative ranking of subjects’ levels is not consistent within the s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.006