Colin S. Gray, deterrence, and contingency
نویسندگان
چکیده
Most scholars as well practitioners in strategic studies recognize that deterrence is contingent upon the opponent choosing to be deterred. This recognition was a contribution made by Colin Gray...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Comparative Strategy
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1521-0448', '0149-5933']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880855