Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A direct revelation mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes — also interpreted as time-shares. Under such dichotomous preferences, the probability that the lottery outcome be a good one is a canonical utility representation. The utilitarian mechanism averages over all deterministic outcomes “approved” by the largest number of agents. I...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005