Collisions and collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition Policy, Collusion, and Tacit Collusion
In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/380033a0