Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection

Dynamic Lending in the Ghatak/Stiglitz/Weiss adverse selection model, with Comparison to Group Lending

We derive an optimal dynamic lending contract in a simple adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side. An optimal contract involves “penalty” rates after a default, and favorable rates after a success. It also charges higher rates for first-time borrowers than for repeat borrowers, as in “relationship” lending. We compare the efficiency of a group lending contract (of t...

Adverse Selection, Market Structure, and Competitive Pricing in Bank Lending

Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection

This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple buyers (e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively contract with multiple firms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be supported as equilibrium terms of trade in the market if each firm’s expected profit is no less than its reserva...

the past hospitalization and its association with suicide attempts and ideation in patients with mdd and comparison with bmd (depressed type) group

چکیده ندارد.

Group Lending with Heterogeneous Types

v Acknowledgments vi