Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collusion in markets with imperfect price information on both sides
The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which rm to purchase from, and each rm only detects the other rms price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while it increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Industrial Organization
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0889-938X,1573-7160
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7