Comment: The Economics of Nonmonetary Variables

Reply Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics

Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives *

We consider a dynamic principal-agent environment in which investments and rewards (compensation opportunities) arrive stochastically over time, and are either taken immediately or foregone. The agent privately observes whether an action is currently available, but he needs the principal’s consent to take it. We show that there exists a unique optimal mechanism and analyze its qualitative prope...

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent’s choice ...

Experimental economics and deception: A comment

At a recent conference at which we were participants (the 1996 Amsterdam Workshop on Experimental Economics) one recurrent theme at a number of sessions was the issue of deception in economics experiments. Not withstanding some heated exchanges, it seemed clear that the predominant view among the participants was that deception in an experiment should be avoided. In the present paper Bonetti ch...

The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson