COMMENTS ON 'REVERSE AUCTION: THE LOWEST UNIQUE POSITIVE INTEGER GAME'
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On ‘ Reverse Auction : the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game
Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439–L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we show that the solution obtained for rational players is not a Nash equilibrium and th...
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A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique i...
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Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a ...
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One of the greatest dramas in the English-language literature of the 20th century is Edward Albee’s (1963) play Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? The play is gripping to most but repugnant to some. It is funny, but it is also scathing. It is a love story, but hardly Romeo and Juliet (2002). It is a highly creative play, its creativity coming from its extreme irony. That irony has much relevance t...
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Collusion between suppliers in reverse auctions may damage buyers’ benifits and then lower efficiency of resource allocation. Under first-price sealed-bid reverse auction mechanism, suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategy and buyers' revenue loss was analyzed considering collusion. Then some general conclusions were given: suppliers' bidding strategy is relevant to some factors such as valuatio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Fluctuation and Noise Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0219-4775,1793-6780
DOI: 10.1142/s0219477508004295