Commission bids for power
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Prices in Power Exchanges with Non-convex Bids
We show uniform, linear prices in power exchange markets, such as in the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) DayAhead market or the Nord Pool Elspot market, that allow nonconvex, “fill or kill” block bids by market participants may not result in an equilibrium in an economic sense, nor do they maximize surplus to market participants. We propose, as an alternative, a multi-part, discriminatory pricin...
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در سالهای اخیر،اختلالات کیفیت توان مهمترین موضوع می باشد که محققان زیادی را برای پیدا کردن راه حلی برای حل آن علاقه مند ساخته است.امروزه کیفیت توان در سیستم قدرت برای مراکز صنعتی،تجاری وکاربردهای بیمارستانی مسئله مهمی می باشد.مشکل ولتاژمثل شرایط افت ولتاژواضافه جریان ناشی از اتصال کوتاه مدار یا وقوع خطا در سیستم بیشتر مورد توجه می باشد. برای مطالعه افت ولتاژ واضافه جریان،محققان زیادی کار کرده ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/350101a0