منابع مشابه
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...
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We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices. A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the imp...
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This article analyzes the experience with performance contracts between developing country governments and the managers of their state owned enterprises. It identifies how problems of information asymmetry, incentives, and commitment can lead to shirking. It applies this conceptual framework to a sample of 12 contracts with monopoly state enterprises in 6 developing countries and finds that all...
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This paper develops a stylized theory of internal organization of the firm based on the interplay between explicit (court-enforced) and implicit (self-enforced) incentives. The firm is modeled as a team that meets repeatedly, and is confronted with a problem of moral hazard. Two instruments are used to induce effort: court-enforced ownership shares over the stream of profits, and self-enforced ...
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Real life contracts imply commitments which are active during their running window, with effects on both normal runs as well as in the case of exceptions. We have defined defeasible commitment machines (DCMs) to provide more flexibility. As an extension to the task dependency model for the supply chain we propose the commitment dependency network (CDN) to monitor contracts between members of th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Preventive Medicine
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0749-3797
DOI: 10.1016/j.amepre.2013.06.020