Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Leadership, Coordination and Cooperation in Common-Pool Resource Management
“This person is at the heart of the system" said a Nepalese farmer about the leader of their irrigation system, "without him there would be no irrigation". There is ample empirical evidence of the importance of leadership for successful management of common-pool resources (CPRs), not least in dealing with the effects of various kinds of disturbances. However, it is hard to find a way to fit lea...
متن کاملA multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation
Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find soc...
متن کاملCorrection: Cooperation Is Not Enough Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0157796.].
متن کاملCooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use
Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived envir...
متن کاملAn intergenerational common pool resource experiment
Many renewable resources are in intergenerational common pools, exploited by one generation after another. In our experiment, the stock available to each generation depends on the extent of exploitation by previous generations and on resource’s growth rate, which is either ‘‘slow’’ or ‘‘fast.’’ Subjects show altruistic restraint in exploitation, but not enough to achieve the social optimum. The...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0095-0696
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1164