Common value experimentation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Common value experimentation
In many economic environments, agents often continue to learn about the same underlying state variable, even if they switch action. For example, a worker’s ability revealed in one job is informative about her productivity in another job. We analyze a general setup of experimentation with common values, and show that the value of experimentation must be equal whenever the agent switches action. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.002