Commonsense knowledge, ontology and ordinary language

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Commonsense knowledge, ontology and ordinary language

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Reasoning-based Intelligent Systems

سال: 2010

ISSN: 1755-0556,1755-0564

DOI: 10.1504/ijris.2010.029813