Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
For a constant ϵ, we prove poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. n-player binary-action games an exp(n) for (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is profile mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction players are ϵ-best replying.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005