Compact circuits for combined AES encryption/decryption
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A More Compact AES
We explore ways to reduce the number of bit operations required to implement AES. One way involves optimizing the composite field approach for entire rounds of AES. Another way is integrating the Galois multiplications of MixColumns with the linear transformations of the S-box. Combined with careful optimizations, these reduce the number of bit operations to encrypt one block by 9.0%, compared ...
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A key step in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is the “S-box.” Many implementations of AES have been proposed, for various goals, that effect the S-box in various ways. In particular, the most compact implementations to date of Satoh et al.[1] and Mentens et al.[2] perform the 8-bit Galois field inversion of the S-box using subfields of 4 bits and of 2 bits. Our work refines thi...
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Compact Reusable Garbled Circuits Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy Master of Science Graduate Department of Computer Science University of Toronto 2014 Garbled circuits are integral to secure function evaluation. A garbled circuit Ĉ for a circuit C enables a user to compute C(x) and nothing more about C or x, when given an encoding x̂ for the input x. Earlier, garbling schemes produced only single-use ...
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Implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), including hardware applications with limited resources (e.g., smart cards), may be vulnerable to “side-channel attacks” such as differential power analysis. One countermeasure against such attacks is adding a random mask to the data; this randomizes the statistics of the calculation at the cost of computing “mask corrections.” The singl...
متن کاملA Very Compact "Perfectly Masked" S-Box for AES
Implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), including hardware applications with limited resources (e.g., smart cards), may be vulnerable to “side-channel attacks” such as differential power analysis. One countermeasure against such attacks is adding a random mask to the data; this randomizes the statistics of the calculation at the cost of computing “mask corrections.” The singl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2190-8508,2190-8516
DOI: 10.1007/s13389-017-0176-3