Comparative statics of games between relatives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Comparative statics of games between relatives.
According to Hamilton's theory of kin selection, species tend to evolve behavior such that each organism appears to be attempting to maximize its inclusive fitness. In particular, two neighbors are likely to help each other if the cost of doing so is less than the benefit multiplied by r, their coefficient of relatedness. Since the latter is less than unity, mutual altruism benefits both neighb...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Population Biology
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0040-5809
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2005.08.002