Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
We study models where two sellers simultaneously decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a nite, not necessarily large, number of buyers who have unit demand and privately known valuations. In the rst model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second model, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers...
متن کاملCompeting Auctions with Endogenous Quantities1
Two sellers decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a nite number of buyers with unit demand and privately known valuations. In the rst model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers decide where to bid. Using the theory of potential games, we show that...
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This paper shows that larger auctions are more ef cient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identicalmarkets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We nd that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer–seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
متن کاملAuctions with Endogenous Selling
The seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber (1982) ranks the expected revenues of several auction mechanisms, taking the decision to sell as exogenous. We endogenize the sale decision. The owner decides whether or not to sell, trading off the conditional expected revenue against his own use value, and buyers take into account the information contained in the owner’s sale decision. We show that reven...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants’ valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.001