Competing through information provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competing Through Information Provision∗
This paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two-buyer, two-seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision. More informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade. I establish how the characteristics of exogenously fixed sale mechanisms determine equilibrium information provision and show that competition gene...
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Theories of absorptive capacity propose that knowledge gained from prior experience facilitates the identification, selection, and implementation of related profitable practices. Researchers have investigated how managers may develop absorptive capacity by building internal knowledge stocks, but few have focused on the distribution of this knowledge within the firm and the role managers play in...
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We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends...
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I study strategic disclosure between multiple senders and a single receiver. The senders are competing for prizes awarded by the receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both verifiable and equivocal: it can influence the receiver both ways. The standard unraveling argument fails as a single sender doesn’t disclose if the commonly known probability that her infor...
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Schott et al. (2007) have shown that the “tragedy of the commons” can be overcome when individuals share their output equally in groups of optimal size and there is no communication. In this paper we investigate the impact of introducing communication groups that may or may not be linked to output sharing groups. Communication reduces shirking, increases aggregate effort and reduces aggregate r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.07.009