Competition between auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a ``natural experiment'' causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue and compare bidder surplus before and after the auction....
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This paper studies market schemes in which auctions are used to coordinate the buyer and competing suppliers in a procurement setting. While auction is typically considered a price-determination mechanism, it could also serve as a coordination mechanism. Possible auction and market mechanisms and their expected payoffs are analyzed in a two-supplier, one-buyer system. The auction mechanism coul...
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This paper studies how a revenue-maximizing auction seller responds to competition outside the auction. Outside competition is modeled by buyer-sided outside options. Since outside options for buyers increase the degree of competition from the seller’s point of view, intuition suggests that a revenue-maximizing seller might seek to enhance the competitiveness of her auction offer. In contrast, ...
متن کاملCompetition in Austrian Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a “natural experiment” causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders caused a significant drop in the yields Austria had to pay for newly issued debt. We use structural...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Marketing Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0923-0645,1573-059X
DOI: 10.1007/s11002-008-9037-2