Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets
Consider a durable goods producer that has the option of monopolizing an aftermarket such as repair for its own product. An important question is whether such monopolization reduces welfare? We show that the anwer to this question is frequently no. In particular, we explore three models that illustrate various ways in which aftermarket monopolization can reduce inefficiencies and thus increase ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2009
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewp006