Competitive bidding and proprietary information

A correction to uniqueness in “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information”

In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information” and provide a correct proof. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; D44

A correction to uniqueness in “ Competitive 3 Bidding and Proprietary Information ”

One of the best known models of auction theory involves an informed bidder competing for 16 a common value object against one or more uninformed bidders. There are at least three reasons 17 why this model became so well known. First, it applies to a wide variety of situations of interest. 18 Second, the model and its variations perform well when matched with the data, as has been shown 19 by He...

Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information

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How competitive is competitive bidding?

Sex Hormones and Competitive Bidding

We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Females bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Moreover, females on hormonal contraceptives bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits than males...