Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability
نویسندگان
چکیده
I present a model of repeated electoral competition between two parties. A part the electorate votes retrospectively and considers amount rent-seeking by incumbent party, while prospective voters follow probabilistic party preferences when casting their votes. show that it is possible to distinguish effects incumbency advantage punishment on minimum level consistent with equilibrium. As long as there for excessive rent-seeking, larger increases accountability decreasing The reason this is, more important result next election all future outcomes is. Consequently, willing give up opportunities improve its prospects. Increased due share retrospective hurts political selection aspect elections because enables win without support majority voters.
منابع مشابه
Television and the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections
We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. Specifically, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where the content originates in the same state as the media consumers versus those where the content originates out-of-state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether televis...
متن کاملConstituency Service and Incumbency Advantage
Numerous scholars have documented a dramatic increase in incumbency advantage in US congressional elections and also state legislative elections over the past four decades.' For example, Gelman and King show that incumbents in the House of Representatives now receive about twelve extra percentage points solely as a result of holding congressional office during the campaign;' the comparable figu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1432-0479', '0938-2259']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01370-9