COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model, competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. therefore propose the new notion of quantity-constrained (QCCE). At QCCE, form expectations about expected supply trades. A buyer expect that trade is not be supplied if corresponding constraint binding. show existence QCCEs via dynamic process updates prices and quantity constraints, equivalence between QCCE outcomes stable outcomes, some other properties like lattice property.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1468-2354', '0020-6598']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12550