Competitive Markets without Commitment

Volatility of Unit Commitment in Competitive Electricity Markets 1

We examine the effects of competition and decentralized ownership on resource scheduling. We show that centralized scheduling of multi-owned resources under imperfect information m y face dificulties that do not arise when resources are centrally owned. We pelfomz a simulation case study using a Lagrangian relaxation-based unit commitment algorithm modified to simulate proposed second-price poo...

Volatility of Unit Commitment in Competitive Electricity Markets

We examine the effects of competition and decentralized ownership on resource scheduling. We show that centralized scheduling of multi-owned resources under imperfect information may face difficulties that do not arise when resources are centrally owned. We perform a simulation case study using a Lagrangian relaxation-based unit commitment algorithm modified to simulate proposed second-price po...

Competitive Markets with Externalities∗

This paper presents a general model of a competitive market with consumption externalities, and establishes the existence of equilibrium in the model, under assumptions comparable to those in classical models. The model allows production and indivisible goods. Examples illustrate the generality and applicability of the results.

Pwp-039 Equity and Efficiency of Unit Commitment in Competitive Electricity Markets

Mechanism design without commitment ∗ , †

This paper identifies mechanisms that are implementable even when the planner cannot commit to the rules of the mechanism. The standard approach is to require mechanism to be robust against redesign. This often leads nonexistence of acceptable mechanisms. The novelty of this paper to require robustness against redesigns that are themselves robust against redesigns that are themselves robust aga...