Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion
* Gentzkow: Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Office 321, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: [email protected]); Kamenica: The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: [email protected]). We thank the Sloan Foundation and the University of Chicago Booth School of Business for financial support. † Go...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0033-5533,1531-4650
DOI: 10.1162/003355302320935098