Compiling symbolic attacks to protocol implementation tests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Compiling symbolic attacks to protocol implementation tests
Recently efficient model-checking tools have been developed to find flaws in security protocols specifications. These flaws can be interpreted as potential attacks scenarios but the feasability of these scenarios need to be confirmed at the implementation level. However, bridging the gap between an abstract attack scenario derived from a specification and a penetration test on real implementati...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.122.4