Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamics of a delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality
A bounded rationality duopoly game with delay is formulated. Its dynamical evolution is analyzed. The existence of an economic equilibrium of the game is derived. The local stability analysis has been carried out. The analysis showed that firms using delayed bounded rationality have a higher chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium point. Numerical simulations were used to show bifurcation diagram...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1026-0226,1607-887X
DOI: 10.1155/2012/698270