منابع مشابه
The INDIRECT FUNCTION of COMPROMISE STABLE TU GAMES and CLAN TU GAMES as a tool for the determination of its NUCLEOLUS and PREKERNEL
The main goal is to illustrate that the so-called indirect function of a cooperative game in characteristic function form is applicable to determine the nucleolus for a subclass of coalitional games called compromise stable TU games. In accordance with the Fenchel-Moreau theory on conjugate functions, the indirect function is known as the dual representation of the characteristic function of th...
متن کاملC-complete sets for compromise stable games
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an ordering of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the ordering their utopia demand as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players at least their minimum right. A game is called compromise stable...
متن کاملA Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation
This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents. Analyzing these situations a new class of...
متن کاملSet-valued Tu-games 3
8 Abstract 9 The goal of this paper is to explore solution concepts for set-valued TU-games. Several stability conditions can be 10 defined since one can have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework. We present 11 two different core solution concepts and explore the relationships among them. These concepts generalize the classic 12 core solution for scalar g...
متن کاملSemiproportional values for TU games
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for twoperson games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.556068