Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computational complexity in additive hedonic games
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration...
متن کاملShao-chin Sung; Dinko Dimitrov: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games *
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. ...
متن کاملShao-Chin Sung und Dinko Dimitrov: Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. ...
متن کاملSimple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games
Hedonic games provide a natural model of coalition formation among self-interested agents. The associated problem of finding stable outcomes in such games has been extensively studied. In this paper, we identify simple conditions on expressivity of hedonic games that are sufficient for the problem of checking whether a given game admits a stable outcome to be computationally hard. Somewhat surp...
متن کاملPrecise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is Σ 2 -complete to decide whether a coreor strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds eve...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1318329