Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computing Constrained Approximate Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented manyplayer games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed that there exists a small constant ǫ, such that it is PPAD-complete to find an (unconstrained) ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game. In the first part of th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Algorithmica
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0178-4617,1432-0541
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-015-0078-7