Concept of bank transfer and bank digitalization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Specification and Animation of a Bank Transfer
The development of formal specifications may benefit from prototyping activities. The production of an executable model for a given description helps bridging the gap between this specification and the corresponding reality. The KIDS/VDM system, based on the KIDS environment, provides these prototyping facilities for the model-based specification language of VDM. This paper illustrates its use ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Modeling and Information Systems in Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2616-6437
DOI: 10.33111/mise.97.8