Conceptual Contention: A Reply

Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to

This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. ‘Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof’, History and Philosophy of Logic 24) to my reconstruction of Anselm’s famous argument in the Proslogion (Klima, G. 2000. ‘Saint Anselm’s Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding’, in G. Holmström-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern T...

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Conceptual Representation of Pictures and Words: Reply to Clark

Clark (1987) offers a dual coding alternative (Paivio, 1971, 1986) to the conceptual hypothesis that Potter, Kroll, Yachzel, Carpenter, and Sherman (1986) proposed to explain the ease with which people can read and understand rebus sentences in which a picture replaces a noun. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for positing a conceptual representation that is distinct from the represe...

Nascent Doubts May Presage Conceptual Clarity: Reply to Surbey

Article: It is difficult for anyone to acknowledge that an idea he or she has been leaching may be invalid. I faced this situation several years ago and, after a period of vacillation, concluded that heritability analysis, the dominant paradigm in behavioural genetics, was not merely weak at its foundations but actively misleading to the nonspecialist; hence, it ought to be relegated to the his...

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