Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities
I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our know...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophia Scientae
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1281-2463,1775-4283
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.735