Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change
We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from oneplace probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probabilit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Philosophical Logic
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-3611,1573-0433
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-011-9176-4