Condorcet Winners and Social Acceptability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Condorcet Winners for Public Goods
In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial struct...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3232784