Confiscating Russia’s Frozen Central Bank Assets: A Permissible Third-Party Countermeasure?

Central Bank Purchases of Private Assets

A model is constructed in which consumers and banks have incentives to fake the quality of collateral. Conventional monetary easing can exacerbate these problems, in that the mispresentation of collateral becomes more profitable, thus increasing haircuts and interest rate differentials. Central bank purchases of private mortgages may not be feasible, due to misrepresentation of asset quality. I...

Party Politics and the Survival of Central Bank Governors

Legally independent central banks leave elected politicians with little direct control over monetary policy. The most important indirect channel of influence for governments thus consists in appointing ‘responsive’ central bank officials and removing ‘hostile’ ones. This premise is tested by examining the effect of partisan ties between central bank governors and governments or presidents in 30...

Party Pooper: Third-Party Libraries in Android

Third-party libraries (3PLs), such as advertising networks, gaming networks, and analytics engines, are an integral part of modern mobile platforms. If Android developers want to integrate functionality provided by 3PLs, they must bundle opaque binary code into their applications. Unfortunately, developers must in essence overprivilege their Android applications by requesting dangerous permissi...

Bank Capital Regulation and Secondary Markets for Bank Assets

How to design bank capital requirements when banks can misreport the value of their assets? We show that the answer depends critically on the existence of secondary markets for bank assets. Without secondary markets, capital requirements based on banks’reporting are more socially desirable than a fixed capital requirement if savings on costly bank capital are suffi ciently high. Yet with second...

Third-Party Decision