Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

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چکیده

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Congestion games viewed from M-convexity

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research Letters

سال: 2015

ISSN: 0167-6377

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2015.04.002