Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations
Recently it has been shown that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable. In this note we show that this finding depends on the use of the infinite population ESS (Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982). When applying the finitepopulation ESS (Schaffer, J Theor Biol 132:469–478, 1988) we show that the conjectures surviving in t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Evolutionary Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0936-9937,1432-1386
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-006-0042-4