Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces...
متن کاملCan Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We !nd that treatment reduces ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: British Journal of Political Science
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0007-1234,1469-2112
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123417000254