Consecutively Halved Positional Voting: A Special Case of Geometric Voting

نویسندگان

چکیده

The Borda count is a positional voting system that favors ‘consensual’ candidates with broad support while plurality instead biased towards ‘polarizing’ ones strong support. Our article focusses first on developing indices for quantifying bias and then vector analysis design, seeking to find an intermediate evenly balanced between consensus polarization. are based the preference weightings of normalized represents class affine equivalent ones. use form geometric progression evolves from this development. Such ‘geometric voting’ can represent any three preferences. With its common ratio as sole variable, also span whole spectrum continuously regardless number preferences it employs; demonstrated by our case study 1860 US presidential election four candidates. Using variable analytical tool, establishes ‘consecutively halved optimum one balance. In 2019 Nauru general election, compared Dowdall rival comprises harmonic several advantages identified.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples

Approval voting is the voting method recently adopted by the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Positional voting methods include the famous plurality, antiplurality, and Borda methods. We extend the inference framework of Tsetlin and Regenwetter (2003) from majority rule to approval voting and all positional voting methods. We also establish a link between approval voting and positional vo...

متن کامل

Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

Given a fixed set of voter preferences, different candidates may win outright given different scoring rules. We investigate how many voters are able to allow all n candidates to win for some scoring rule. We will say that these voters impose a disordering on these candidates. The minimum number of voters it takes to impose a disordering on 3 candidates is 9. For 4 candidates, 6 voters are neces...

متن کامل

The Core with Positional Spatial Voting

After introducing a way to analyze positional voting outcomes in a spatial voting context, ‘core’ type theorems are proved for these voting rules, and their runoffs, in the single issue setting. While spatial voting has proved to be a valuable way to interject geometry and geometric intuition into the analysis of voting rules, the current methodology is essentially limited to pairwise compariso...

متن کامل

Avoiding Paradoxes in Positional Voting Systems

It is well-known that no voting system can be entirely fair: this is Arrow’s Theorem, which states that under a certain natural definition of fairness, the only fair voting system is a dictatorship. Thus, in democratic political systems, one expects voting paradoxes in which different voting systems give different results. We analyze the mathematical basis of paradoxes amongst a certain class o...

متن کامل

A New Proposal on Special Majority Voting

Special majority voting is usually defined in terms of the proportion of the electorate required for a positive decision. This note reassesses that definition, and proposes an alternative. The proposal is to define special majority voting in terms of the absolute margin between the majority and the minority required for a positive definition. It is shown that if we use special majority voting f...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Social Sciences

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['2326-988X', '2326-9863']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20231202.11