Consistency in house allocation problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revisiting Consistency in House Allocation Problems and the Computational Approach to the Axiomatic Method
How should we allocate a social endowment of objects among a group of agents when monetary compensation is not possible? Typical examples are the assignment of offices among faculty and the assignment of tasks among subalterns. We follow an axiomatic approach and impose two properties on rules: Pareto-efficiency and consistency. Previous research arrived at a “dictatorship” result imposing anot...
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This paper studies allocation correspondences in the house allocation problems with collective initial endowments. We examine the implications of two axioms, namely “consistency” and “unanimity.” Consistency requires the allocation correspondence be invariant under reductions of population. Unanimity requires the allocation correspondence respect unanimity, that is, it assigns to every agent th...
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We study Pareto optimal matchings in the context of house allocation problems. We present an O( √ nm) algorithm, based on Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Method, for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching, where n is the number of agents and m is the total length of the preference lists. By contrast, we show that the problem of finding a minimum cardinality Pareto optimal matching is N...
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We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given instance. McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time algorithm for counting the number of popular matchings when the preference lists are strictly ordered. We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that the problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard when there are ties. We give an...
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We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00038-5