Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of probabilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed by ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.3982/ecta13337