Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) soci...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400179