Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Search with Adverse Selection∗
This paper introduces a sequential search model with adverse selection. We study information aggregation by the price–how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices–when the search frictions are small. We identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when the search frictions are small. We trace this to a strong form of the winner’s curse...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2925521